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Abstract
This paper focuses on the wage differential between men and women from the viewpoint of 
“labor market segmentation theory,” using micro-data. As an analysis framework, labor markets 
were separated into oligopolistic integrated industrial sectors and competing industrial sectors, 
and estimates made that take into account the simultaneity of wages and employment of men 
and women in each industrial sector. The results of analysis show that both men and women 
experience diffi culty in fi nding employment in integrated sectors after leaving employment at a 
company, and that there are limits on the movement of labor between sectors. It also found that 
there is a sample selection functioning in the employment decisions made in each sector, and 
even when bias due to this factor is taken into account, the values of the production factors within 
integrated sectors are large compared to the differences for men and women in competing sectors. 
Further, approaching segregation structures by deriving expected wages for men and women who 
switch sectors suggested that the wages for both sectors may act as a limiting function on the 
movement of workers between sectors.
JEL: J21, J22, J23
Keywords:  Wage Differentials, Segmented Labor Market
1.  Introduction
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act was enacted in 1985. This law has the goal of (1) 
promoting the equality of women with men in all types of work and in all workplaces, and (2) 
improving the ability of women to accomplish professional duties by providing equal opportunities 
for training, and through this, to resolve the male-female wage differential. As intended by the Equal 
Opportunity Act, this disparity is certainly decreasing, but even now, after twenty years it has not yet 
been eradicated completely. This document uses analysis of actual proofs based on individual data 
collected for the “Working Person Survey 2002,” which was conducted on workers in the Tokyo area 
by Recruit Co., Ltd.’s Works Institute, and discusses actual differentials in employment and in wages 
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for men and women in a metropolis based on the “Labor Market Segmentation Hypothesis” from the 
standpoint of (1) (the goal of promoting equality, as mentioned above) and on the “Male / Female 
Wage Disparity Hypothesis” from the standpoint of (2).
Economic theories on wage differentials can be broadly categorized into “human capital theories” 
supporting the “male / female wage disparity hypothesis” and the “labor market segmentation 
hypothesis,” which is from another school of thought. The former states that worker productivity is 
decided through the accumulation of human capital due to education and workplace. Here the wage 
differential is simply a difference in the attributes of the workers, and areas that cannot be explained 
by such differences can be attributed to discrimination in the labor market or employers' specific 
preferences with regard to their employees, or alternatively by factors unrelated to worker attributes, 
such as imperfect competition in the labor market.
Conversely, the “Labor Market Segmentation Hypothesis” states that rather than all workers being 
present in any single unifi ed labor market, they are separated into different markets with different job 
characteristics, working conditions, and wage structures, and that movement between them is subject 
to divisive limitations. That is, workers do not choose the labor market they are present in of their own 
free will, but are placed there by the controlling power of the economic system. The “effi ciency wage 
hypothesis” is part of this theory and claims that employers will set higher wages than the competition 
to retain staff, and in doing so, prevent movement of labor.
As regards the “Labor Market Segmentation Hypothesis,” Horn-Kawashima (1985) and Kawashima 
and Tachibanaki (1986) differentiated between integrated industrial sectors centered around 
olipological enterprises, and competitive sectors consisting mainly of small-to-medium businesses, 
and used the 1978 Basic Survey on Wage Structure to analyze wage differentials between men and 
women in full-time employment. The results show that women are concentrated in competitive 
sectors, and that even female university graduates are excluded from integrated sectors at the core 
of the economy. They also identify the possibility that these two sectors have differing rules and 
disparate wage structures, and that wage differentials between men and women are larger in the 
integrated sectors. However, this research does not analyze the frequency of labor movement between 
sectors, which is one of the indices for market segmentation. Further, approximately 20% of the 
workers employed at small businesses were removed from the data subject to analysis, and part-time 
workers were removed from the validation analysis of sector segmentation.
Bulow and Summers (1986) explain the hypothesis that labor movement between sectors is 
exceedingly small through effi ciency wage differentiation in the labor market. Employee motivation 
is decided through wage premiums that the workers accept, which affects industry productivity. 
Enterprises pay non-competitive wages that are higher than market rate (effi ciency wages) to improve 
employee motivation, prevent negligence, ensure high quality work, and discourage employees from 
leaving. Similarly, Katz (1986) states that payment of effi ciency wages is important in internal labor 
markets that have a direct relationship with wages and productivity, and points out that markets in 
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which effi ciency payments are not made are competitive1.
Recently in Japan, Ishikawa and Dejima (1994) use a switch regression model that does not require 
dual-layered labor market structures to be separated into two divisions (Primary and Secondary) in 
advance for their investigation. They find that the labor market in Japan can be summarized with 
differing formulas rather than with one single formula. They also show that the quality of these 
markets varies.
Nakata (1997) asserts that even when the primary goal of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act 
is evaluated in terms of the effects of the Act in supplying equal opportunities for all occupational 
categories, analysis of labor productivity factors is incomplete if these categories are not taken into 
consideration. Nakata also emphasizes the validity of the “Labor Market Differentiation Hypothesis,” 
based on the signifi cant differences in wages between men and women of similar ages originating 
in the market value assigned to “age” as a factor in labor productivity, while giving no credence to 
years of continuous service and years of work experience as signifi cant factors in wage differentiation 
between men and women when estimating wage functions for occupational categories. Further, 
Furugori (1997) touches on the dual-layer structure of labor markets from the standpoint of full-time 
employees versus those not working full time.
Conversely, while a great deal of research has been done using "Human Capital” theory, Tomita 
(1988), Higuchi (1991), Mitani (1995) propose the hypothesis that there is little difference in training 
investment between men and women in businesses and industries with no discrimination between men 
and women in employment control, and apply it to show that male-female wage disparities based on 
years of continuous service will also be reduced, with Higuchi and Mitani showing promising results. 
A one-time cross-sectional analysis has been performed, but Hori (1998) used indices from the 1986 
and 1994 Basic Survey on Wage Structure to show that improvements in the status of women due to 
the “Gap Effect,” which cannot be observed statistically, have helped wage differentials between men 
and women2. However, analysis in these research efforts, which take a “Human Capital” approach, 
does not assume division in the marketplace.
This paper does not treat “Labor Market Segmentation” and “Human Capital” as exclusive, but 
attempts to use micro-data to show, from a “Human Capital” standpoint, that male-female wage 
discrepancies remain fi rmly rooted both within and between the markets analyzed, by showing that 
labor markets are clearly segregated by sex.
Section II below presents the data used, while Section III introduces the framework and methods 
used in analysis. Section IV presents the results of analysis, and provides an interpretation of them. A 
summary can be found in Section V.
1 Conversely, Becker (1971) identifi es a trend towards discrimination due to prejudice that increases in proportion to the 
infl uence a business has in a market. We can therefore point to the possibility that there may be more prejudice against 
women in more integrated industries if there is a correlation between market infl uence and business scope.
2 Nagase (1994) is present in analyses investigating wage disparities in part-time and full-time employees.
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2.  Data
Data was obtained from the “Working Person Survey 2002,” which was conducted on workers in 
the Tokyo area by Recruit Co., Ltd.’s Works Institute. This survey was conducted between August 
and October of 2002, targeting an area within 50km of the capital (metropolitan Tokyo, Kanagawa 
prefecture, Chiba prefecture, Saitama prefecture, and part of Ibaraki prefecture), the Kansai region 
(Hyogo prefecture and metropolitan Osaka and Kyoto), and the Tokai region (Aichi and Gifu 
prefectures). There were 17,105 samples returned in total, 13,085 of which were from the Tokyo 
region (with 9,010 responses from men and 4,075 from women). There were 2010 responses from 
Aichi and 2010 from the Kansai region, but this document only analyses the sample from the capital. 
The samples analyzed in this paper are specifi c to the metropolitan area, and show the current state 
and problems present there. The capital of Japan, Tokyo is adjacent to three prefectures, Chiba, 
Kanagawa, and Saitama. The aggregate of these three prefectures and the Tokyo area is commonly 
referred to as the Tokyo area or the metropolitan area. Calculating the wage differential for male and 
female employees working full-time in fi scal 2002 from the wage census for fi scal 2003 shows that 
metropolitan Tokyo has the largest male-female wage differential in the country, and when calculations 
are weighted with the number of employers, this differential can be taken to represent approximately 
36% of the differential for the entire country. Moreover, this region represents approximately 31% 
of Japan's total manufacturing (and 36% of the service industry) as of FY 2002, and therefore has 
signifi cant infl uence.
The advantage of this data is that it is a large enough sample and that it has been weighted back 
against the population, so that it offers an extremely accurate picture of the true state of employment 
in the metropolitan area.3 Moreover, in addition to being comparatively new micro-data, the content of 
the survey questions covers everything from hiring, industry, occupational category, and work content 
in detail.
As described above, this paper postulates that “Labor Market Segmentation” is at the root 
of male-female wage differentials. With regard to the dual-layer composition of labor markets, 
Kawashima and Tachibanaki (1985) follow Horn-Kawashima (1985) in saying that business size 
and market influence are linked in making long-term profit possible4, and place the foundation of 
the dual-layer structure in the industries in both the competitive industrial sector and the integrated 
sector. Employment integration is at the foundation of the defi nitions of both industry sectors. When 
the number of people working for large companies with more than 1000 employees is more than 30% 
of the total number of workers in the industry, that industry can be defi ned as an integrated sector; 
areas where this fi gure is less than 30% are competitive sectors. This data covers 63 types of industry, 
with each item bearing a strong resemblance to the industry categories in the Basic Survey on Wage 
Structure5. With regard to bipolar categorization, Horn-Kawashima (1985) mentioned that it is 
3 Ages 35 through 39 are weighted lightly, and ages 50 and over are weighted heavily. Consequently, there is a low 
recovery rate in evidence for those in middle and old age.
4 Horn-Kawashima (1985) mentions the necessity of using businesses as units in analysis, since small and medium 
enterprises exist in integrated sectors.
5 Horn-Kawashima (1985) used production integration as an index to measure levels of integration for the manufacturing 
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essential to fi nd the intrinsic differences between the integrated sector and the competitive sector when 
looking at them together; this document complies with this thinking. The next section will explain the 
analysis framework and methods. Results will be discussed in section IV.
3.  Analysis Framework and Methods
When analyzing wage differences between men and women based solely on Human Capital Theory, 
only characteristics and their respective values are important enough to be considered. However, 
in analyzing the difference based on Human Capital Theory and Market Segmentation Theory, two 
assumptions should be added; 1) both sectors have differing wage structures, and 2) there is little 
movement between sectors.
First the wage function for male and female full-time employees is described in (1) and (2) below.
  (1)
  (2)
Subscripts m and f denote male and female employees respectively. 1 and 2 are affiliation 
categories, e is an error term, X is a vector for explanatory variables contributing to wage functions for 
each category, and  is an unknown parameter.
Here, in accordance with “Labor Market Segregation Theory,” workers are divided into the 
integrated sector and the competitive sector, and it can be supposed that economic system control is 
active in this segregation. That is to say, the hiring factors for male and female employees in each 
sector are decided by both the decisions of the employees themselves and by the controlling power of 
the market. This control might for example take the form of (non-competitive) effi ciency wages set by 
businesses that pay more than the market rate to ensure the profi ciency of employees. 
First dependency determinations for both sectors in the fi rst stage can be shown as follows.
 
 
  (3)
In stage 2, if  is taken as the employee attribute that decides the wages of full-time employees, 
then the wages of employees in each sector is:
  (4)
industry, and confi rms the close interactive relationship between production integration and employment integration. 
The industry categories in the “Working Person Survey” resemble those of the “Wage Census.” Comparing sector 
categories derived from data from the “Working Person Survey” with sector categories that use cross tables of business 
size employment numbers and manufacturing categories from the “Wage Census,” contradictions were apparent in 
sector categories in the three industries and three service industries at the top 30% on the borders dividing both sectors. 
However the “Wage Census” does not include micro-businesses with less than 10 employees, and since this may affect 
categories, this document divided sectors based on industrial categories and fi gures for business size-specifi c employee 
numbers from the “Working Person Survey.”   
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In this paper, parameters for formulae (1) through (4) obtained through switching regression are 
estimated using the method of maximum likelihood. 
Here it is assumed that error terms for each formula will exhibit multivariate normal distribution, 
and that a covariance matrix will be defi ned as follows.6
 
  (5)
First  is tested. In other words, for formula (3), employee hiring factors in each 
market are thought not to support the  hypothesis in cases such as those where the 
economic control to divide markets into integrated and competitive sectors is present, regardless of 
the matching between supply and demand characteristics of employers and the employees themselves. 
If  is provisionally true, then the exogenous switching regression model or the Ordinary 
Least-Squares method (OLS) is appropriate, but if it is not true, this model should use endogenous 
switching regression.7
Next, areas in which the structure of labor market segmentation is explained through disparities in 
male-female employment between two sectors, and areas where segmentation is ascribed to male-
female wage disparities within the various sectors, are investigated separately.
Of the parameters listed in table 1, which contains male-female descriptive statistics, the signifi cant 
variables included in vector Z for formula (3), which are used in estimates for men and women, 
are the square of the age, the age on joining the company, a dummy variable indicating whether the 
person had children when they joined the company, a dummy variable indicating whether they have 
a spouse, a dummy variable for academic achievement, a dummy variable for any experience of 
leaving employment or joining a company after the epoch-making changes to the industrial structure 
that occurred after the collapse of the bubble economy in 1993, and a dummy variable for leaving a 
company after 1993. These variables were chosen as being deciding factors in supply and demand 
for employment in each industrial sector. Dummies for age when joining the company, age squared, 
children when joining the company, spouses, experience leaving the company, experience joining 
a company after 1993, and experience leaving a company after 1993 were inserted as discriminant 
variables (operating variables) not included in wage functions.8
Further, in estimations of wage functions for stage 2, non-signifi cant variables were dropped from 
6 Maddala (1999) goes into detail regarding likelihood functions.
7 Nielsen,Helena,S.and Verner(2003) are references for switching regression.  In this research, sector determination is 
analyzed from the standpoint of self selection. 
8 To measure the propriety of operating variables, these first-stage dependencies were estimated for cases where 
variables were included in wage functions. However, since there were no changes inρ that would indicate an erroneous 
correlation, this was not deemed problematic. 
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the functions present in the descriptive statistics from tables 1, with variables with a signifi cance level 
of 20% being used for estimation. However, most variables have a signifi cance level of 10%. Since it 
is not diffi cult to think of disparate explanatory variables (explanations) for effects on wages in each 
sector when using switching regression to perform simultaneous inference, explanatory variables for 
wage functions differ for each sector.  
Next, to gain a better understanding of the decisive factors in wage disparities using the wage 
functions estimated using the model above, factor analysis of wage disparities was carried out. The 
Integrated Sector Full-time Competitive Sector Full-time
Variable Male Female Male Female
Logarithm of Wage 6.435 5.751 6.233 5.660 
Work Time 47.664 40.411 49.695 40.883 
Higher-education 0.538 0.229 0.397 0.200 
Junior College/Vocational School 0.129 0.391 0.179 0.446 
High School 0.309 0.370 0.357 0.327 
Junior High School 0.023 0.010 0.067 0.027 
Age 39.370 35.079 38.356 36.383 
Less than one year tenure 0.027 0.054 0.035 0.057 
Less than two year tenure 0.053 0.135 0.082 0.123 
Tenure 14.646 8.026 12.030 7.219 
Experience in work 137.676 93.264 136.763 97.995 
Manager 0.622 0.221 0.521 0.168 
Science 0.250 0.034 0.121 0.031 
Married 0.780 0.478 0.744 0.478 
Children 0.677 0.449 0.663 0.480 
Married at time of entry into company 0.163 0.313 0.279 0.379 
Had children at time of entry into company 0.131 0.319 0.216 0.369 
Age at time of entry into company 24.723 27.052 26.325 29.164 
Has left a position 0.327 0.514 0.542 0.648 
Has left a position since 1993 0.217 0.400 0.379 0.521 
Joined company after 1993 0.442 0.711 0.562 0.763 
Large company 0.524 0.484 0.191 0.114 
Mid-size company 0.289 0.263 0.301 0.286 
Small company 0.153 0.206 0.362 0.414 
Very small business 0.034 0.047 0.147 0.186 
Service/Security 0.185 0.071 0.364 0.225 
Management 0.192 0.052 0.158 0.021 
Offi ce work/Sale 0.272 0.678 0.246 0.459 
Technical 0.298 0.084 0.123 0.015 
Specialist 0.045 0.106 0.088 0.252 
Other job category 0.007 0.009 0.021 0.026 
Construction 0.000 0.000 0.177 0.068 
Manufacturing 0.525 0.288 0.162 0.102 
Transport/Communications 0.128 0.043 0.107 0.031 
Wholesale/Small retailer 0.027 0.069 0.173 0.185 
Finance/Insurance 0.155 0.500 0.019 0.029 
Servie 0.161 0.100 0.277 0.494 
Other industry 0.004 0.000 0.084 0.091 
Weight 0.905 1.317 0.920 1.455 
Sample size 1991 609 3011 1048 
Note) the statistics of dummy variables indicate % of 1.
?????? ????????????????????????????????
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method used by Brown (1980) for investigating male-female wage disparities due to occupation was 
applied as a disaggregating analysis technique. This method uses factor analysis that takes the effect 
of setting hiring factors in both sectors on wage differentials into account.
First, the ratios of male and female samples in each area are set as Pm and P f.  Formulas  (1) and (2) 
above, which show the male-female wage differentials for the entire labor market, use the subscript “S” 
to denote each sector.
  (6)
Equation (10) is expanded polynomially as follows.
  (7)
Here P from formula (7) shows employment probabilities for female workers in each industrial 
section when men and women are employed under the same conditions. Parameters obtained using 
variables observed for male workers from the results of estimations made using switching regression 
from formula (3) were used to obtain P for employment probabilities for female workers in each 
industrial sector. The fi rst two columns on the right show wage differentials within the same sector, 
while the last two show wage differentials between sectors. The fi rst and third items on the right show 
wage differentials due to attributes observable in men and women, while the second and fourth show 
wage differentials that refl ect differences in evaluation that include employment discrimination based 
on observable characteristics. The last column shows differences attributable to gender, including 
male-female employment differentiation for hiring factors for each sector. 
For example, if the most commonly-used disaggregating technique to date (that of Oaxaca (1973)) 
is applied, the difference in male-female distribution across each industry sector provides no part of 
the structure of male female wage differential. However, the deaggregating technique proposed by 
Brown (1980) is able to show the possibility that differences and segregation in the employment of 
men and women in both industry sectors may affect male-female wage differentials. Because the wage 
assessment variables differ for men and women in each sector, coefficients that are not significant 
variables for one gender are estimated to be 0, and mean values for variables are used to measure the 
effect of attributes.
The main points for consideration in this document that can be taken from there above series of 
analysis are, based on labor market segmentation theory: (1) Whether there are barriers to movement 
between the two sectors. (2) Whether there are differing characteristics and wage structures in 
both sectors. (3) Showing the extent to which differences in employment in each sector, and wage 
differentials between men and women in each sector contribute to male-female wage disparities 
throughout the entire market. 
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4.  Investigation and Interpretation of Analysis Results
This section looks at the results of analysis sectionally. Factor analysis is carried out on the 
functions for sector hiring factors in stage one, then for wage functions in each sector, and also for the 
wage differentials obtained from the results of analysis, and the causes for wage disparities assessed. 
Lastly, the anticipated values of wages when workers move from each sector are sought from the 
results of switching regression used in estimation, and investigations made into the explanations 
for measurement correlates, and the controlling factors at work in dividing markets so that labor 
movement is hindered.  
4.1  Results of Estimations for Hiring Factors in Integrated Sectors
First the results displayed in table 2 for the switching regression in stage 1 were investigated. 
This illustrated that the explained variables targeted show the hire rates for men and women in the 
integrated sector as compared to the competitive sector.  They show the results when employment of 
full-time personnel is limited. The investigation was conducted while comparing men and women. 
They show that the older the person at the time of entry to the company, the more diffi cult it is to 
find employment in the integrated sector. For women, where age is controlled, marital status and 
the presence of children have a positive effect on hiring in the integrated sector. This may be due 
to the survey being conducted on full-time employees only. With regard to academic achievement, 
predictions are that those with a higher degree of education will find it easier to find employment 
in the integrated sector. Those who have experienced leaving a company find it difficult to obtain 
employment in the integrated sector regardless of gender. This has a level of signifi cance of 1% for 
estimation for both genders. That is to say, the existence of barriers to the movement of labor between 
both sectors is in agreement with the “Labor Market Segmentation” hypothesis. Moreover with the 
exception of full-time female employees, employment, or even a career change, within the integrated 
sector after the collapse of the bubble has become diffi cult.
Male Female
Explanatory Variable Coeffi cient Standard Error Coeffi cient Standard Error
Constant term 0.335 0.237 -0.285 0.277 
Age when joining company -0.069 0.015 -0.020 0.004 
Square of age when joining company 0.001 2.1E-04 - -
Children when joining company - - 0.196 0.077 
Spouse present when joining company -0.126 0.059 0.132 0.074 
Higher education 0.593 0.098 0.577 0.279 
Junior college 0.399 0.103 0.354 0.268 
High school graduate 0.482 0.094 0.577 0.271 
Experience leaving a position -0.155 0.058 -0.157 0.093 
Joined company after 1993 -0.074 0.047 - -
Experience leaving a position after 1993 -0.243 0.072 -0.194 0.078 
Graduated from a science university 0.375 0.060 -0.217 0.157 
N 5002 1657 
?????? ??????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????
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4.2.  Results of Estimates for Wage Functions
Next, analysis moves to wage-related estimates. Table 3 lists the results of stage 2 wage functions 
from switching regression for male-female full-time employees. ρ0 shows a positive level of 
signifi cance for estimates for men, and with a correlation coeffi cient of 0.7.  This validates support 
for endogenous switching regression. However, for women, ρ0 is also signifi cant, with a correlation of 
0.9. Therefore the results of OLS estimation do not show consistency. Interpretation of this ρ will be 
examined in detail later.
Estimation results for each sector are compared while being examined, but variables with a 
significance level of other than 20% for men and women were not utilized in the estimates, so 
evaluation variables are different for each gender. Age was not significant for women, nor were 
variables related to job content. When comparing coefficients for each sector by gender, for men, 
evaluation coeffi cients for academic record, years of continuous service, and age were all higher  in 
integrated sectors than in competitive sectors. However, evaluation related to time mastering work 
shows a larger trend towards coeffi cients for men in the competitive sector. Conversely, for women, 
academic record is more highly evaluated in the competitive sector, while years of continuous service 
are better evaluated in the integrated sector. 
Next, comparing men and women shows that for women in the integrated sector, other than when 
a tangible ability for work shows a comparatively more significant effect on wages than for men, 
coeffi cients are lower than for men, and signifi cant variables are limited. In the competitive sector, 
attributes such as academic record and years of service have more effect for women than for men. 
Dependent variable/log of 
annual income
Male Full-time employees Female Full-time Employees
Integrated Competitive Integrated Competitive
Explanatory Variable Coef. Sd.Error Coef. Sd.Error Coef. Sd.Error Coef. Sd.Error
Constant term 4.749 0.079 5.314 0.048 4.815 0.118 5.016 0.096 
Working Hours 0.002 0.001 - - 0.010 0.002 0.004 0.001 
Higher education 0.288 0.043 0.221 0.028 0.124 0.043 0.545 0.082 
Junior college/Vocational 
school 0.149 0.042 0.079 0.029 - - 0.299 0.077 
High school graduate 0.154 0.039 0.093 0.027 - - 0.267 0.078 
Science university graduate 0.064 0.022 0.108 0.022 - - - -
Management 0.132 0.016 0.107 0.014 0.082 0.046 0.174 0.026 
Age 0.014 0.001 0.011 0.001 - - - -
Married 0.139 0.018 0.109 0.019 - - - -
Have Children - - 0.036 0.017 -0.129 0.037 - -
Tenure less than two years -0.123 0.024 -0.147 0.023 -0.241 0.061 -0.101 0.035 
Tenure 0.025 0.003 0.020 0.003 0.051 0.008 0.035 0.006 
Square of tenure -4.8E-04 6.2E-05 -2.6E-04 6.8E-05 -0.001 2.3E-04 -3.0E-04 2.0E-04
σ2 0.350 0.004 0.416 0.010 
ρ2 0.717 0.148 0.901 0.352 
σ1 0.299 0.008 0.415 0.029 
ρ1 0.632 0.471 0.532 1.855 
Log likelihood -3870.787 -1532.517
Note)  Variables with signifi cance and with a standard of 20% are used in the estimates.  Estimate include factors for industry, occupation, 
business size, and years of experience in job if they are signifi cant.
?????? ??????? ?????????????????????????
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However evaluation regarding quality of work was comparatively less signifi cant than for men9.
4.3.  Results of Brown (1980)’s Causal Analysis on Wage Disparity
Next, causal analysis on the male-female wage differential was performed using Brown’s method 
(1980), based on the estimate results in tables 2 and 3, providing numerical comprehension of the 
differing wage structures in both sectors. The results are show in table 4. 
In Formula (3) from the previous section  is the probability of hiring for women, obtained using 
coeffi cients for sector hiring functions for men. Results for each item in formula (7) are displayed. The 
overall male-female wage disparity (logarithm) is 0.654, Contributions to the disparity are calculated 
with this disparity set to 100%, and are shown on the bottom line. These results show that overall the 
production factor (coefficient) disparity for wages is approximately 75% of the male-female wage 
differential. Moreover, differences in male and female attributes affect the hiring disparities between 
men and women in integrated sectors (with a coeffi cient of determination of 13.5%), and while the 
numbers in brackets for the fi rst and second expressions show differences in male-female attributes 
and attribute values (coefficients) within sectors before Pf is applied, the largest is a difference of 
0.603 for coeffi cients within integrated sectors, which is approximately 1.7 times larger than that of 
competitive sectors. Multiplying this figure by the distribution Pf for women in each sector shows 
that fi gures for the competitive sector, in which more women work than men, contribute to the male-
female wage disparity across the entire market. Put another way, expansion of the competitive sector 
in the future can be expected to contribute to the reduction of male-female wage disparities.      
The results above show that male and female attributes affect which sector people employed in, 
and moreover, that women employed in integrated sectors are affected by gender discrimination 
based on production factor values. In particular, the results from wage estimation functions show 
that evaluation for “age,” “years of service,” and “quality of work” with regard to setting wages for 
9 It is conceivable that there is a correlation between job training time and abilities at work. For women in the 
competitive sector, when ability variables were dropped there were signifi cant variables in profi ciency time. Estimates 
using either one of those variables were trialed, but they did not have any large effect on the results of the causal 
analysis carried out later. 
Differences in wages for Each Sector Differences in Hiring Factors in Each Sector
Differences in 
attributes Differences in Coef.
Differences in 
attributes Differences in Coef.
Integrated sectors 0.033 0.222 0.065 0.03
(Differences within sectors) (0.093) (0.603)
Competitive sectors 0.048 0.225 0.023 0.005
(Differences within sectors) (0.080) (0.356)
Difference Total 0.081 0.447 0.088 0.035
Contribution to Percentile 
differences 12.5 68.5 13.5 5.5
Note) Figures in brackets done wage differences with sectors from which Pf for which female hiring rations has been removed.
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women working in integrated sectors is lower than for men, and illustrate that more research will be 
needed to investigate the reasons for this phenomenon.   
4.4  Simulation and Interpretation of Results
ρ2  figures denoting correlation with error clauses from the results of analysis of both men and 
women are related to error clauses in wage functions for competitive sectors, and are signifi cantly 
positive. The following examines the interpretations of these results. Figures 5 and 6 show wage 
fi gures expected by men and women for each age bracket10. 
Formula (3) described above shows that two simultaneous determinations can be considered: hiring 
functions for businesses (demand causes) and worker selection functions (supply causes). In the 
results of the analysis in this document, there was no change in ρ fi gures even when variables related 
to self-selection are inserted into the parameters in stage 1. Further, the ρ correlate fi gures show that 
causes for  hiring decisions (demand-side factors) can be considered to be signifi cant, and an analysis 
based on this is performed11. Figure 6 shows age bracket-specific wage expectations derived for 
highly-educated (university graduate or above) men and women in each sector. The results for men 
from above are used for investigation. Defi nitions for anticipated values (1) through (8) are written 
in the notes below. Results (1) and (6) from OLS estimation can be explained through wage ratios 
presented for each sector displayed for the market prior to selection. Lack of correlation for ρ such as 
that described in this document can be interpreted as implying agreement between worker productivity 
and wages presented. However, non-observable worker attributes with an influence during hiring 
correlate with error terms in wage functions, and wage expectations (productivity) of workers assume 
different fi gures to OLS results. These are fi gures (3) and (8).  This denotes anticipated conditional 
wage expectations for each sector covered.  
It is obvious that in the integrated sector the values of conditional expectations for men are slightly 
higher than the OLS results12, while the fi gures for men in the competitive sector (8) are lower. When 
non-observable attributes are taken into consideration, the workers in integrated sectors exhibit the 
same or greater productivity for equivalent suggested wages, while men in competitive sectors accept 
higher wages that their productivity would suggest (including attributes that cannot be taken into 
consideration). Based on this pre-condition, let us look at labor movement when moving sectors. 
The figures in (2) are the suggested wages when movement of workers from integrated sectors to 
competitive sectors is considered, while the figures in (4) are the wages expected when workers 
10 Although the methods used (expansion of formula) for deriving figures for conditional expectations were 
omitted, the wage expectations of people employed in integrated sectors are E(W1i|Ii=1,x1i)=βx1i+σ1ρ1f(φZ)/F(φZ). 
Similarly, the wage expectations of those working in competitive sectors who wish to work in integrated sectors 
are E(W1i|Ii=0,x1i)=βx1i?σ1ρ1f(φZ)/?1?F(φZ)?. The wage expectations for workers moving from integrated to 
competitive sectors and the wages of those hired in competitive sectors can be derived from σ and ρ.
11 In reality, when a positive correlation is found with error terms in wage functions for the competitive sector, the degree 
of error term u in stage 1 (even when they can be employed in integrated sectors for observable attributes, they are 
actually dropped due to selection of unobservable attributes) and the error term ε for competitive sectors become 
negative, and it is diffi cult to think of a self-selection model for choosing a sector that fi ts oneself. 
12 However, it is necessary to pay attention to points that are no signifi cant to ρ.
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Men in integrated sectors Men in competitive sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Age Chorhort E(W1i|x1i) E(W2i|x1i) E(W1i|S=1) E(W2i|S=1) E(W1i|x2i) E(W2i|x2i) E(W1i|S=2) E(W2i|S=2)
less than 25 5.85 5.86 6.02 6.08 5.81 5.81 5.68 5.64 
25 to 39 6.13 6.11 6.29 6.34 6.02 6.03 5.90 5.87 
30 to 34 6.38 6.34 6.55 6.55 6.28 6.25 6.15 6.08 
35 to 39 6.57 6.50 6.73 6.71 6.44 6.40 6.31 6.23 
40 to 44 6.70 6.61 6.86 6.82 6.56 6.50 6.43 6.33 
45 to 49 6.80 6.72 6.95 6.92 6.66 6.59 6.52 6.41 
50 to 54 6.86 6.79 7.00 6.98 6.73 6.67 6.59 6.49 
55 to 59 6.90 6.84 7.05 7.04 6.79 6.75 6.65 6.56 
Mean of Wage(log) 6.52 6.46 6.68 6.67 6.41 6.38 6.28 6.20 
Women in integrated sectors Women in competitive sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Age Chorhort E(W1i|x1i) E(W2i|x1i) E(W1i|S=1) E(W2i|S=1) E(W1i|x2i) E(W2i|x2i) E(W1i|S=2) E(W2i|S=2)
less than 25 5.54 5.67 5.76 6.03 5.56 5.67 5.42 5.43 
25 to 39 5.78 5.83 5.99 6.19 5.72 5.77 5.59 5.54 
30 to 34 5.97 5.98 6.19 6.36 5.80 5.87 5.67 5.65 
35 to 39 6.05 6.04 6.27 6.42 5.88 5.99 5.76 5.79 
40 to 44 5.57 5.85 5.80 6.24 5.88 6.01 5.76 5.81 
45 to 49 6.25 6.27 6.50 6.70 6.02 6.10 5.91 5.91 
50 to 54 6.39 6.37 6.65 6.81 6.01 6.12 5.89 5.92 
55 to 59 6.45 6.59 6.32 6.36 
Mean of Wage(log) 5.82 5.87 6.04 6.25 5.76 5.83 5.63 5.61 
Note) (1)(2)(5) and (6) are the results of OLS estimates. (4) and (7) are conditional expectations when moving sectors. (3) and (8) are 
conditional expectations in current sectors.
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Men in integrated sectors Men in competitive sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Age Chorhort E(W1i|x1i) E(W2i|x1i) E(W1i|S=1) E(W2i|S=1) E(W1i|x2i) E(W2i|x2i) E(W1i|S=2) E(W2i|S=2)
less than 25 5.74 5.75 5.94 6.02 5.68 5.70 5.59 5.57 
25 to 39 5.97 5.95 6.18 6.23 5.91 5.89 5.82 5.78 
30 to 34 6.18 6.14 6.39 6.41 6.08 6.05 5.98 5.92 
35 to 39 6.34 6.27 6.54 6.54 6.22 6.17 6.13 6.05 
40 to 44 6.46 6.39 6.65 6.65 6.33 6.26 6.24 6.14 
45 to 49 6.55 6.48 6.74 6.74 6.41 6.35 6.31 6.21 
50 to 54 6.59 6.54 6.79 6.80 6.52 6.45 6.41 6.32 
55 to 59 6.63 6.62 6.82 6.88 6.58 6.53 6.48 6.40 
Mean of Wage(log) 6.31 6.27 6.52 6.54 6.16 6.12 6.06 5.99 
Women in integrated sectors Women in competitive sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Age Chorhort E(W1i|x1i) E(W2i|x1i) E(W1i|S=1) E(W2i|S=1) E(W1i|x2i) E(W2i|x2i) E(W1i|S=2) E(W2i|S=2)
less than 25 5.92 6.14 6.21 5.99 5.82 5.70 5.70 5.36 
25 to 39 6.06 6.30 6.35 6.08 5.96 5.87 5.84 5.42 
30 to 34 6.17 6.45 6.47 6.12 6.05 5.98 5.94 5.43 
35 to 39 6.25 6.55 6.57 6.23 6.09 6.05 5.99 5.42 
40 to 44 6.31 6.62 6.61 6.26 6.19 6.16 6.08 5.47 
45 to 49 6.44 6.75 6.73 6.35 6.33 6.30 6.21 5.62 
50 to 54 6.58 6.90 6.87 6.49 6.35 6.32 6.23 5.54 
55 to 59
Mean of Wage(log) 6.01 6.25 6.30 6.04 5.90 5.08 5.78 5.38 
Note) (1)(2)(5) and (6) are the results of OLS estimates. (4) and (7) are conditional expectations when moving sectors. (3) and (8) are 
conditional expectations in current sectors.
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actually moved to competitive sectors. Although men working in integrated sectors can be expected 
to exhibit the same level of productivity after moving to the competitive sector, the suggested wages 
from industry (2) will be slightly lower than the wages in their current sector. Consequently, there is 
little these men to move to competitive sectors of their own accord. Similarly when workers in the 
competitive sectors are considered, the wages expected (productivity) (7) from a move to an integrated 
sector will rise above the current wages expected (8). However, since the productivity of workers 
is lower than the suggested wages of businesses in the integrated sector (5), there is no incentive 
for businesses in the integrated sector to hire workers who have moved from competitive sectors. 
Similarly, workers from competitive sectors moving to an integrated sector cannot expect a great 
increase over the suggested wages in their current sector (7), it is diffi cult to imagine any incentive 
to make the effort to move. Simulation fi gure 7 for women and those who have not graduated from 
university shows that a similar interpretation can be used in this case. As the descriptive statistics 
in figure 2 show, there is little difference between integrated and competitive sectors with regard 
to the degree of workers’ satisfaction regarding work or the organizations they work in. There are 
mechanisms functioning that ensure a certain level of ambition and satisfaction with regard to work 
even though markets are segregated, and it is possible that workers are aware of this13.
5.  Summary
This paper hypothesized the segregation of markers represented by competitive sectors and 
olipological integrated industrial sectors, and examined male-female wage differentials. 
Analysis used methods that gave consideration to the possibility that wages were set endogenously. 
The results of analysis show that it is difficult for both men and women to find employment in 
integrated sectors if they have experience leaving a position. They also show that there is a selection 
bias in setting supply and demand for laborers in each industrial sector and that even if this bias is 
taken into account, that “age” has a signifi cant effect on wages for men in integrated sectors. This also 
conforms with theories regarding effi ciency payments closely related to market segregation. Moreover 
the results of analysis of male-female wage differentials split into male-female employment disparity 
between sectors and intra-sector wage differences show that due to differences in male and female 
attribute, men are 13% more likely to fi nd employment in integrated sectors. Additionally, it was clear 
that there are large differences within the same sector in the value (differences in coeffi cient) attached 
to production factors (attributes) for men and women, approximately 1.7 times that of competitive 
sectors.   
However, since the competitive sector accounts for a larger percentage of the overall market, it 
makes a large contribution to male-female wage disparities for the overall market, and it is evident that 
13 Based on interpretations such as this, workers on borders between sectors, that is to say, workers who it is not diffi cult 
to imagine fi nding employment in integrated sectors, but who must work for low wages in competitive sectors, may 
exhibit low levels of satisfaction. It could be said that a more detailed analysis of this point is necessary. Additionally, 
the fact that the analysis in this document does not cover non full-time employees, which may merit further analysis. 
OSAKA ECONOMIC PAPERS Vol.59 No.4??96?
the difference in male-female production factors (attributes) in each sector accounts for approximately 
69% of the male-female wage differential. 
The above results show that 1) labor markets are segregated, and there are limits on the movement 
of labor between each market, and 2) that wage structures are different within each market. Further, 
the results of simulations used to extrapolate the wages that workers hope to earn through moving 
imply that there market control is active in determining the workers’ sectors, and works to limit the 
free movement of labor. However, this many not always be to the detriment of workers in each sector. 
This suggests that the results of this document do not contradict the market segmentation proposed by 
the “Labor Market Segmentation” hypothesis that may be at the root of this disparity. This is mostly 
in agreement with the results of previous research, and implies that market segmentation is the root 
cause of the wage differential that still exists between men and women.  
Themes for future research may be a detailed investigation into labor movement between sectors 
that use workers past work history, and analysis that takes account of changes in setting sector 
boundaries, and of markets segmented by business scope.  
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